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In the last resort, labor productivity is the most important, the 
decisive factor for the victory of  the new society. 
Y I. Lenin 
In November  1989 the Wall  came down. Less than a year later the former 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) had fully adopted the West German eco- 
nomic, legal, and institutional framework. In July  1990 the currency reform 
took place, and by October of that year the German Democratic Republic had 
ceased to exist. Monetary  social, and economic union was accomplished al- 
most by the stroke of a pen. The radical transition sent a clear signal that the 
break with the past was both complete and irreversible, thus setting the basis 
for a rapid restructuring. 
The immediate effect of unification on East Germany's economy was noth- 
ing short of radical. The five new states are now in the midst of a depression 
that economically, although not socially, dwarfs the Depression of the 1930s. 
GDP fell by almost 30 percent (see fig. 5.1), and industrial production stands 
at less than 50 percent of the 1989 level. Unemployment, including short time 
and public works programs, exceeds 30 percent of the labor force (see table 
5.1). Eighteen months after unification, the output and employment decline 
appears to have been arrested; the first signs of  recovery are visible. Yet  the 
turnaround rests on massive transfers-DM  139 billion in 1991 and an esti- 
mated DM 180 billion in 1992.' 
The challenge and the big question is how to move from here to a viable 
economy, with far higher productivity, far higher employment, and sharply re- 
duced transfer payments. Nobody entertains an illusion that this can be accom- 
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Fig. 5.1  GDP and industrial production (index 1990: 111 = 100) 
Table 5.1  Key German Data, 1991 
West  East 
GDP (billion DM)  2,502  193.1 
Employment (millions)  29.0  7.3 
GDP/ernployment  86,341  27,034 
Annual wage (DM)  44,640  19,920 
Consumption per capita (DM)  2 1,600  12,300 
Unemployment (%’.)”  4.8  29.5 
Transfers (% of GDP)  5.5  12.9 
Source: DrW Wochenberichr, nos. 1-2  (1992); Sachverstandigenrat (1991). 
“Including short work (50 percent), public work programs, retraining measures, and forced early 
retirement (in 1990 prices). 
plished in a year or two, but can it be done in ten or fifteen? And, even if it can 
be done in ten or fifteen years, is that long a transition politically acceptable? 
The interesting questions today lie in two directions. One set of queries con- 
cerns the transition  and the policies that were used. The decline was to some 
degree inevitable:  the bill for forty years of  mismanagement,  inefficient re- 
source allocation, and environmental neglect came due overnight. Yet one may 
ask whether the one to one conversion and the acquiescence in massive wage 
increases following unification significantly worsened the collapse and, if so, 
whether there were plausible alternatives? The other set of problems concerns 
policy choices in the area of privatization, restructuring, and subsidies. Should 
policy focus on maintaining employment, or should it accelerate the transfor- 
mation;  is it more important  to move companies  into private  hands  at any 157  East German Economic Reconstruction 
price-in  terms of revenues and of job losses-or  should policy focus on get- 
ting deals that lock in restructuring. 
This paper reviews the transition experience in East Germany and comments 
on the policy choices and results in four areas: 
The monetary reform and the conversion question 
The collapse of production 
The privatization debate and experience 
The migration issue 
Before entering the detailed discussion, it is worth offering some perspec- 
tive. The political decision by Chancellor Kohl to take a plunge-financially 
and economically-was  dramatically bold. While there is, of  course, an im- 
portant purpose served in discussing how things were done and how they might 
have been done, the basic fact is that East Germany is experiencing a radical 
economic transformation that will make it viable in not too many years. The 
transformation  costs a fortune, it is painful,  it could not be done without the 
special intra-German relation, but it is working. One view is that it will take a 
generation; we believe, however, that most of the work will be done in fifteen 
years. 
One wonders how, with far less external support, the other post-Communist 
societies can expect to make their transition. One possible answer is that they 
will not. The other is that they do not suffer the special German handicap of 
unification with wage parity in sight but with productivity far out of line. 
5.1  The Conversion Issue 
The conversion  debate involves three separate questions.* The first deals 
with the  sanitation of  balance  sheets of  firms and banks  at the time of the 
monetary reform, the second has to do with the appropriate rate of conversion 
for monetary assets of the public, and the third concerns the choice of a conver- 
sion rate for current payments, specifically wages3 
5.1.1  Balance Sheets 
On the asset side, the national balance sheet of East Germany contains state- 
owned property ranging from real estate and forests to shops, pharmacies, and 
Kombinate. On the liability side are the monetary holdings of the public and 
external debts. It is apparent that, at this stage, internal debts did not represent 
a net liability of the public to the government. In the consolidation of banks 
and  firms-both  state owned-they  simply  canceled  out.  Moreover,  since 
these debts bore no relation to the future earning capacity of the firms, and 
2. For a comprehensive treatment of  the monetary aspects of unification, see Nolling (1991). 
3. For a detailed institutional discussion and an assessment, see Lipschitz and McDonald (1990). 158  Rudiger Dornbusch and Holger C. Wolf 
Assets 
since their cancelation would have most assuredly not have had any moral haz- 
ard connotations, they should simply have been written off. 
The sale price of Treuhand enterprises could in principle be altered to reflect 
the debt holdings. But one cannot help gaining the impression that, had debts 
been canceled, banks and firms would now have cleaner balance sheets and 
debts would be no extra, unnecessary complication throughout the system. In 
the present setting, the Treuhand employs debts as a negotiating point, assum- 
ing debt sporadically to render enterprises more palatable to potential buyers. 
By this circuitous route, a sizable fraction of debt will eventually end up in the 
federal budget anyway, but in a manner that further obscures the role of  the 
Treuhand and the responsibilities of managers. 
5.1.2  Monetary Conversion 
The second aspect concerns the conversion of  monetary  assets (see table 
5.2). The reason that the conversion rate for monetary  assets receives  such 
central  importance  is,  of  course,  that,  for  most  East  German  households, 
money constituted the dominant part of overall asset holdings. Other financial 
instruments did not exist, nor, with few exceptions, did directly held real assets. 
In the year prior to reform, the black market rate had reached seven ostmarks 
to the deutsche mark, falling off toward the conversion date in response to the 
public discussion of the likely conversion rates. The actual conversion rate- 
on average 1.6 ostmark per deutsche mark-resulted  from a one to one rate of 
conversion for assets up to a certain level, with special provisions for certain 
groups, and a rate of two to one for the remaining assets. The argument for a 
favorable conversion  rate here is primarily political:  not to disappoint asset 
holders/savers on day one of the new money and the new market. Of course, 
the drastic reduction of  money balances in the 1948 reforms did not prevent 
high saving rates in the  1950s, suggesting that political considerations were 
preponderant. 
The monetary  conversion  did not  involve a transfer from the West to the 
East. Rather, in the East, bank balances were simply redenominated from ost- 
marks into deutsche marks. Actual deutsche mark cash required to meet with- 
Liabilities 
Domestic credit  180.7 
Foreign assets  36.3 
Other  29.0 
Total  246.0 
~ 
Deposits  156.0 
Enterprises  27.8 
Foreign liabilities  55.6 
Currency  6.8 
Other liabilities  ~  27.0 
Total  246.0 
Source: Lipschitz and McDonald (1990). 159  East German Economic Reconstruction 
drawals was obtained from the Bundesbank by borrowing at the discount rate. 
With this arrangement, the choice of the conversion rate involved a redistribu- 
tion among various holders of monetary assets-rich  and poor-and  an inter- 
generational redistribution. Favorable rates of conversion for households, with- 
out a correspondingly burdensome  conversion  rate for debtors, redistribute 
wealth toward the current generati~n.~  This implies a reduced incentive to save 
and an increased burden, at least in the short run, for the West, which under- 
writes the solvency of the system. While ultimately the burden might be paid 
out of  net revenues from the operation and liquidation of  state property, that 
prospect appears increasingly illusionary. 
5.1.3  Wage Conversion 
In the run up to monetary union, one of the hottest questions concerned the 
rate chosen for wage conversion. Interestingly, from the present perspective, it 
seems altogether a moot issue. Not moot, of  course, is the question of how 
wage parity without matching productivity  will work out for growth and pro- 
ductivity. 
At the time of conversion, East German wages were roughly one-third those 
in the West (at a one to one exchange rate), and East German productivity was 
about one-third that of the West. Thus, a one to one conversion rate seemed 
broadly plausible. The black market rate, however, had been as high as seven, 
and the “shadow” exchange rate that priced the resource cost of one deutsche 
mark’s worth of exports corresponded to an exchange rate of four ostmark per 
deutsche mark. The Bundesbank argued strongly against the one to one conver- 
sion: in their view, a far less favorable conversion-two  to one-was  essential 
to make East Germany competitive and hence to avoid an employment or a 
fiscal disaster. 
As it turned out, the one to one conversion had no lasting effect on relative 
wages:  since the conversion,  wages in the East have increased  steadily, and 
outright parity is the avowed objective of unions on both sides. Parity, in time, 
seems also to be accepted by politicians, for whom a two-part society is basi- 
cally  unacceptable. Of  course, a two-part society cannot really  be avoided: 
rather than having a sizable income gap dividing East and West, the line is now 
increasingly drawn between those who are and those who are not employed. 
The push toward wage parity is the outcome of a game between unions aim- 
ing to minimize labor market competition and a government all but forced to 
generously underwrite unemployment, actual or hidden. The solution to that 
game is a high-wage strategy in the East, fatally driving toward wage parity 
at least in the organized sectors at the cost of  large-scale unemployment (cf. 
Brauninger 1991; Burda and Funke 1991; and Franz 1991). 
4. If households responded immediately to their new opportunities in goods or assets markets, 
the East German banking system would not have been viable. Public infusion of capital would 
















Fig. 5.2  Industrial production (index 1990: 111 = 100) 
5.2  The Output Collapse 
The rapid transition resulted in a severe initial decline in production.5 Output 
in the manufacturing sector fell by half within a few months (see fig. 5.2).  This 
section tries to determine why output dropped so sharply. 
Before proceeding to details of the decline in activity and the range of expla- 
nations, it is interesting to put the output collapse in perspective, comparing 
East Germany with other transition economies. The striking difference is the 
dramatic extra decline in 1991, which comes on top of an already large fall in 
1990 (see table 5.3). 
The decline in production  has been matched, with a lag, by a decline in 
employment. While the official unemployment figure remains relatively small, 
very sizable fractions of the economically active population have shifted into 
quasi unemployment in various forms, including short work,6 retraining, early 
retirement, and public work programs, or have withdrawn from the East Ger- 
man labor force (see table 5.4).’ 
Total employment has fallen by more than 2 million; a further 1.6 million 
employment relationships are conditional on public support. In the aggregate, 
5.  For comprehensive treatment, see Burda (1990), Neumann (1991), Siebert (1990,1991), and 
Sinn and Sinn (1991). 
6.  The short work regulation allows firms to retain workers while shifting the major part of wage 
costs to the unemployment insurance agency. 
7. Prior to unification, East Germany boasted the world’s highest female labor force participa- 
tion ratio. After unification, the cutback in day-care centers forced a sizable reduction in the ratio. 
In addition to a reduction in the female labor force, some 450,000 economically active individuals 
moved to West Germany. 161  East German Economic Reconstruction 
Table 5.3  Output Collapse in Transition Economies (% changes) 
Industrial 
GDP  Production 
1990  1991"  1990  1991' 
Czechoslovakia  -3  1  -100  -4  0  -100 
Hungary  -5  0  -5 0  -8  5  -8  0 
Poland  -130  -6  0  -21  1  -120 
East Germdny  -13  3  -20  0  -53  9  -18  6 
Sources: DIW Wochenbericht, nos. 1-2  (1992); Sachverstandigenrat (1991). 
"991  figures until fall. 
Table 5.4  The Labor Market: East Germany (thousands) 




























8,165  8,142 
7,250  6,798 
6,735 
5 15 
915  1,343 
-365  -  500 
1,640  520 
I85  393 
110  435 
Sources: Sachverstandigenrat (1990,1991);  DIW Wochenbericht, nos. 5-6  (1992); BMWI (1992). 
"January  or last observation. 
the active labor force has declined by  more than 40 percent since  1989. A 
comprehensive measure of  unemployment approaches one-third of the labor 
force. 
The decline in employment is particularly  acute in  the industrial and the 
agricultural sectors. In industry, estimates of the medium-term labor force re- 
duction center at 50-60  percent of initial employment. In contrast, employ- 
ment in the service sector remained fairly constant, with substantial increases 
in the highly skilled professions. 
While the decline in production dominated the decline in employment dur- 
ing the second half of  1990, the further reduction in employment during 1991 
at fairly stable output levels resulted in an increase in measured productivity 
and turnover per employee. In the aggregate, turnover per employee remains, 
however, at a quarter of the West German level and thus substantially below 
relative production costs. 
As a result of wage increases in excess of productivity increases and declines 
in producer prices, wage bills for a large fraction of the East German enter- 162  Rudiger Dornbusch and Holger C. Wolf 
prises exceed net value added at factor costs. The net losses are covered by 
Treuhand liquidity loans and asset sell-offs. 
5.2.1  Output and Spending 
From the GDP accounts, it is immediately apparent that all individual com- 
ponents  of  real  demand  increased  between  1989 and  1991 (see table 5.5). 
Thus, a fall in absorption cannot explain the  decline in output. Second, the 
dramatic increases in import-equal  to half of  1989 real GDP-dominates 
by far any other development. 
Additional information comes from the sectoral breakdown of GDP (table 
5.6). The aggregate decline reflects primarily the sharp drop in industrial out- 
put. In other sectors, there was either expansion or at most a moderate drop. 
Sectors with high nontradable components, in particular construction, printing, 
and services, face high demand, while tradables sectors went into a steep de- 
cline. Thus, computer production virtually vanished, while printing expanded. 
The data suggest two questions. First, what happened to the composition of 
demand? Second, with so much of  a fall in industrial output, how could the 
demand for nontraded goods stay high? 
The second question has, of course, an immediate answer in the massive 
transfers from the West that in various forms, including unemployment com- 
pensation and the financing of short work, sustained disposable income and 
hence kept up real aggregate demand (table 5.7). This explanation draws im- 
mediate attention to the problem of continuing transfers. Without transfers, 
disposable income would fall by 40 percent or more, and that would mean a 
collapse  of  demand  for the  entire  domestic  sector.  Transfers  are therefore 
bound to stay for a long time, although there is an important question of how 
best to target them. 
As to the composition of demand, there is no surprise in the expansion of 
services and construction. The former did not substantially exist in the GDR 
and therefore will be built up increasingly over the years to come. The expan- 
Table 5.5  GDP Decline by Component (billion DM, constant 1990:2 prices) 
Contribution to 

































Source: DW  Wuchenbericht, no. 33 (1991), nos. 1-2  (1992). 163  East German Economic Reconstruction 
Table 5.6  Value Added (billion DM, quarterly rates, not seasonally adjusted) 
1990:  1  1990:3  1991:l  1991:3 
Agriculture  1.7  2.8  1.1  2.4 
Industry  34.8  15.0  11.2  9.5 
Handicrafts  4.2  5.0  4.5  5.5 
Construction  4.2  4.8  3.8  6.1 
Trade  3.5  3.3  2.2  2.2 
Services  8.1  9.0  10.5  9.0 
GDP  70.5  54.0  45.7  46.4 
Source: DIW Wochenbericht, nos. 51-52  (1991). 
Note; All data in prices of  second half year 1990. 
Table 5.7  Income and Consumption (billion DM) 
1990  1991  199P 
Disposable income  182.3  206.0  251.51 
Net wages and salaries  116.3  102.0  116.0 
Transfers  45.7  72.0  89.5 
Distributed earnings  28.0  43.0  58.5 
Deductions  7.7  10.5  12.0 
Private consumption  175.2  201.5  232.0 
Source: DIW Wochenbericht, nos. 1-2  (1992). 
"Forecast. 
sion of construction reflects the extraordinary state of disrepair of the housing 
stock, the availability of materials, and the need to create an infrastructure for 
the service sector. The relative ease of construction-in  terms of skill require- 
ments,  lumpiness, credit,  and planning-further  helps understand  the early 
expansion. Not surprisingly, construction is booming. 
The remaining question then concerns the collapse of industrial output. 
5.2.2  Industrial Output Decline 
Complementary explanations for the dramatic fall in industrial output in- 
clude the following: markets disappeared in the former CMEA (Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance) trading partner countries; consumers shifted to 
Western goods because  of  availability or cost competitiveness;  firms were 
caught in a cost-price bind where they could no longer profitably produce. 
Production might have declined because management was unable to cope with 
the breakdown of the traditional organization of input supply and output mar- 
keting, which gave way to a market economy. 
The most immediate source of a decline in production has to do with firm 
closing by the Treuhand. A case in point involves the production of automo- 
biles-the  Trabant. But closing down of firms has so far not been pursued on 164  Rudiger Dornbusch and Holger C. Wolf 
a very wide scope, and thus important reasons for the fall in output must be 
looked for elsewhere. 
The next reason for output decline has to do strictly with the supply side: 
firms faced a radically different set of relative prices. Wages increased, and so 
did materials prices, while many other inputs became freely available at much 
lower prices, requiring a radical behavioral change. At the same time, the shift 
to markets entailed a near complete depreciation of the organizational human 
capital of  Eastern  managers: the procurement  abilities that characterize  the 
successful manager under central planning are of little use in a market environ- 
ment. The disruption of the status quo often translated into bottlenecks in mate- 
rial supplies or in an inability to maintain markets in the new environment. 
On the demand side, the collapse of CMEA trade, shown in table 5.8, is an 
important part of  the story. The decline is partly explained by the disruption 
and recession in the partner countries-CMEA  trade in 1985-88  averaged 71 
percent of East German exports. Substantial export credits and guarantees help 
sustain exports to Eastern Europe and especially to the former Soviet Union. 
Moreover, prices of exporting firms do not yet  fully reflect costs. Liquidity 
credits and increasingly sales of productive assets still finance the discrepancy 
between costs and prices. The fall in demand from this region is not only ex- 
plained by disruption but is also a reflection of the broader choice now avail- 
able to the former partner economies and, of course, the exchange rate. 
Although trade is an important element of the demand collapse, we should 
look mostly to domestic demand. A key factor in reducing demand was, how- 
ever, surely the new and radical competition  from the West. Overnight, all 
barriers to imports were eliminated, and Western goods, distributed by Western 
firms, became completely  accessible.  Thus, even though  total consumption 
spending rose (in constant prices), the demand shifts toward Western goods far 
outweighed the increase in spending. Particularly in the initial opening, import 
penetration  at the retail level reached in some areas as much as 90 percent 
(table 5.9). It is worth recording that those goods that did survive the initial 
test are now  making a comeback. A case in point is a champagne with the 
brand name “Rotkappchen.” 
Interestingly, the import penetration is not focused exclusively on West Ger- 
man goods. For example, of  1991 new car registrations in the East, 56.6 per- 
cent were actually foreign, with only 6.3 percent coming from former CMEA 
partners (Die Welt, 2 February 1992). 
Table 5.8  East German Merchandise Exports (billion DM) 
Total  CMEA  Other 
1988  40.2  30.1  10.1 
1989  41.1  29.8  11.3 
1990  38.1  30.5  7.6 
1991  17.9  12.1  5.8 
Sources:  Sachverstandigenrat (1991); Deutsche Bank (1992). 165  East German Economic Reconstruction 
Margarine  35 
Cooking oil  41 
Detergent  53 
Black tea  66 
Table 5.9  West German Goods on East German Shelves (West German goods 
as % of retail sales) 
Fat  76 
Fruit yogurt  90 
Chocolate  96 
Source: Die Zeit, 28 September 1990 
In judging the shift into imported goods, it would be a mistake to emphasize 
availability exclusively. Price clearly did matter-East  German citizens bought 
cheaper cars than West German citizens. East Germany clearly did not have a 
substantial price advantage. With nominal wages rising in excess of productiv- 
ity, prices were high, and firms lost output owing to reduced demand. 
Interdependence effects must also have played a role. To the extent that the 
production decline occurred at the stage of final goods, there was a feedback 
to intermediate goods that were no longer demanded and hence, in the absence 
of  alternative  markets,  no longer produced. The extreme inflexibility of the 
planned  economy may have seriously  aggravated the effect of final demand 
reductions throughout the production system. 
5.2.3  An Assessment 
Few observers would have predicted so dramatic a fall in production. The 
question  arises why  output  in other East  European  economies  declined  so 
much less. Part of the answer lies clearly in the exchange rate or wage level: 
in East Germany, consumers could afford to buy Western goods, and they did 
splurge, more so because the prices were not at all out of line with the prices 
of similar (although “inferior”) East German goods. 
Poland had only moderate protection and thus offers a good comparison. 
The chief  difference  in the  degree  of  import  penetration  comes  from  two 
sources. First, East Germans were already introduced to West German goods 
via the widely watched West German television. Second, in the case of East 
Germany, the West German  firms organized  the import  and distribution  of 
West German goods drawing on their experience and their resources. In  the 
Polish case, this was done predominantly by small-scale Polish traders without 
scale and capital and thus with a far larger handicap. In addition, of course, 
the purchasing power of Polish wages in terms of foreign goods was minimal 
compared to that of West Germany after unification. 
In the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic or Hungary, by comparison, trade 
restrictions continued at substantial levels up to the end of 1991 and in some 
measure even beyond. Moreover, even in the absence of trade restrictions, im- 
ports were forbiddingly expensive,  and hence the demand shift was far less. 
The economies have in common, however, that much of industrial restructuring 
still lies ahead. In Germany, the availability of substantial transfers will cushion 
the blow, and investment will have to create high-wage jobs. In the other East 166  Rudiger Dornbusch and Holger C. Wolf 
European  economies, a supercompetitive exchange rate will have to be the 
chief mechanism for creating new employment as inefficient operations are 
streamlined. 
In conclusion, there is no single explanation for the dramatic output decline. 
But, if  a summary explanation is to be given, it has to be the combination 
of  an overnight eradication of all trade bamers in  a situation where product 
alternatives were known, products were made available instantly by the West, 
and wages were high enough to make large-scale import spending possible and 
optimal. That makes the East German case very special. 
5.3  Privatization 
The transition economies confront the dual problem of  overall capital defi- 
ciency and misallocation of the existing resources. Ideally, the privatization 
process  solves both problems  by  channeling resources to salvageable firms 
while freeing inefficiently allocated resources through the liquidation of nonvi- 
able enterprises. This section reviews the operation of  the Treuhand and as- 
sesses its success and the prospective difficulties.8 
5.3.1  Treuhand Organization 
The hard-line  stance of  the Honecker government yielded an unexpected 
benefit to the East German privatization process: shunning partial reform, the 
socialist regime retained  ownership of  most productive assets under central 
control, eliminating the problem of “spontaneous privatization” and enabling 
the wholesale transfer of ownership to a newly founded agency, the Treuhand 
(THA). 
At the time of its inception, the THA assumed ownership of approximately 
95 percent of the enterprise sector, comprising some 9,000 industrial firms, 
20,000 commercial enterprises, 7,500 hotels and restaurants, and 40 percent of 
the total land area, with a total employment of  3 million. The Treuhand is 
charged by  law with privatizing the enterprises under its control, enforcing 
budgetary discipline, encouraging know-how transfers, fostering the creation 
of a competitive economic system, and stimulating capital inflows. Residual 
revenues from privatization are to be used as compensation for the losses in- 
curred by the East German savers during monetary unification, thus implicitly 
obliging the Treuhand to extract substantial revenues form the privatization 
process (see table 5.10). 
The THA provides liquidity assistance to enterprises, services debt, and can 
assume environmental liabilities and claims arising from ownership disputes. 
The Treuhand enjoys near complete authority over the enterprises under its 
control, including liquidation and separation into subunits. It is thus fairly un- 
restricted in the manner in which it can discharge its obligations, facing neither 
8. For extended expositions ofprivatization, see Beirat (1991), Bos (1991), and Sinn (1991). 167  East German Economic Reconstruction 
Table 5.10  lkeuhand Budget, 1991 (billion DM) 
Revenues  37.1 
F’rivatizations  15.8 
Others  1.1 
Deficit  20.8 
Expenditures  37.7 
Interest and principal  13.8 
Restructuring of firms  12.9 
Cost of sales  4.8 
Other  6.2 
Source: Bos (1991). 
detailed de facto supervision nor binding deadlines for the completion of  its 
tasks. 
5.3.2  Treuhand Strategy 
adopted a set of policies. 
Single Owners 
The survival of  many enterprises in the transition economies depends on 
their ability to attract a “foreign” investor willing to transfer process know- 
how, management, and marketing skills. The incentive for investors to become 
“active” depends positively on the stake held. Privatization plans consequently 
tend to include a role for majority shareholders (e.g., Blanchard et al. 1991; 
Lipton and Sachs 1990; and Tirole 1991). The Treuhand has pushed this con- 
sideration to the limit, concentrating on selling the entire object to a single 
buyer. 
Most of the mammoth Kombinate cannot of course be sold as an entity. To 
obtain  privatizable  units,  the  Treuhand has  begun  to  split  enterprises  into 
“core” and “noncore” businesses, to be sold separately. The breakup of Kom- 
binate and even of  smaller operations thus represents an important simplifi- 
cation. 
The wide leeway to customize notwithstanding, the Treuhand has implicitly 
Criteria 
In deciding on a privatization proposal, the Treuhand places weight on in- 
vestment and employment guarantees in addition to the price offered. Potential 
investors are required to submit a detailed restructuring plan, including pro- 
posed investment and employment levels. Both proposals are binding; viola- 
tors incur a contractual penalty. 
Liquidity Credits 
With few exceptions, the Treuhand has presumed enterprises to be salvage- 
able by default until balance sheets have been drawn up and approved, provid- 
ing liquidity credits in the meantime.9 After the completion of  the balance 
9. Some 80 percent of enterprises have received liquidity credits. 168  Rudiger Dornbusch and Holger C. Wolf 
sheets,  liquidity  credits  for the  two  lowest-ranked  enterprise  groups  have 
been discontinued. 
Debt 
Enterprise debts in the postsocialist economies predominantly reflect arbi- 
trary pricing decisions made under the former regime. By judging enterprise 
viability on the basis of ability to cover net of debt service outlays, the Treu- 
hand has recognized  the  arbitrariness of the  debt distribution  across enter- 
prises. Debts have been de facto consolidated, and enterprises contribute to 
debt service on the basis of their current and predicted cash flow. 
5.3.3  A Case Study: Zeiss Jena 
Before unification, Zeiss Jena employed 27,000 workers, predominantly in 
opticals. In March 1991, the Treuhand offered Zeiss Jena to its Western “sister” 
company, Zeiss Oberkochen. The THA took on the firm’s accumulated debt of 
$812 million. Zeiss Jena was split into two subunits. Fifty-one percent of Carl 
Zeiss Jena GmbH was acquired by Zeiss Oberkochen for a price of DM 0.00. 
The Treuhand provided $375 million in start-up funds and loss compensation 
until 1995. The new firm employs 2,800 people. 
The second unit, Jenoptik, was transferred to the state of Thuringia and re- 
tained 7,000 employees. The Treuhand provided $687 million in start-up funds 
and loss compensation until 1993. In total, some 17,000 jobs have been elimi- 
nated, with a per capita compensation of $13,750. Total Treuhand outlays are 
$812 million for debt, $1.06 billion for start-up funds and loss compensation, 
and $188 million for job loss compensation, in total $2.06 billion or $212,500 
per job saved. Current forecasts view  1997 as the first profitable year for the 
restructured enterprises. 
5.3.4  Outcome Today 
After an extended period of preparation, privatization has begun in earnest, 
with around thirty sales per week. The impressive numbers-more  than 5,200 
privatizations  to date out of  an initial  stock of  7,100 enterprises (see table 
5.1 1)-are,  however, somewhat misleading as the total number of enterprises 
has increased, reflecting the parceling strategy. Nevertheless, the Treuhand has 
made very rapid progress, ensuring employment for one-third of the original 
employees and obtaining some DM 114 billion in investment guarantees. 
The overall picture hides  substantial sectoral differences. Privatization  of 
small- and medium-scale service enterprises is nearly completed. The transfer 
of utilities to the local authorities likewise has proceeded largely on schedule. 
In contrast, the privatization of the large industrial behemoths suffering from 
obsolete capital stocks, substantial overstaffing, environmental risks, and rap- 
idly disappearing export markets remains sluggish. Privatization from below 
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Table 5.11  Privatization: Progress to Date 
Jun. 91  Nov. 91  Feb. 92 
Cumulative sales (no.)  2,583  4,777  5,584 
Employment guarantees (1,000s)  511  857  1,150 
Investment guarantees (billion DM)  64  105  140 
Total sales revenues (billion DM)  10  16  19 
Closings  529  87 1  983 
Management buyouts  ...  808  894 
Sources: Sachverstandigenrat (1991); BMWI (1992); Financial Times, 3 March 1992. 
"February  or latest. 
ently inactive, it is estimated that the 435,000 new registrations imply some 
175,000 effective enterprise foundations. 
On the closure front, the Treuhand has been hesitant. While internal esti- 
mates apparently place the fraction of nonsalvageable enterprises at 30 percent 
and external estimates range considerably higher (Akerlof et al. 1991), as of 
December  1991 only 983 enterprises, less than  10 percent of  existing firms, 
have been closed. 
5.3.5  Problems and Issues 
The availability of West German financial and personnel support, political 
stability, a hard currency, and EEC membership greatly facilitate the East Ger- 
man privatization process. While privatization has picked up, sales and particu- 
larly revenues fall short of  the initial optimistic expectations.I0 In its annual 
member  survey, the DIHT (Deutscher Industrie  und  Handelstag)  identified 
concerns about environmental liabilities, a lack of infrastructure, a shortage of 
experienced local administrations, and legal uncertainty as the major obstacles 
perceived by potential investors (see table 5.12). 
Increasingly, the THA faces three challenges: how much tailoring should go 
into the privatization process, how to deal with regional issues, and how to 
resist political pressures surrounding closings of large plants. We briefly com- 
ment on these. 
Regional Policy 
The extreme degree of industrial concentration frequently makes closing an 
enterprise commensurate with a decision to eliminate the industrial base of a 
town or an entire region, giving rise to conflicts between the microeconom- 
ically justified decision to liquidate a nonviable enterprise and regional policy 
objectives. For example, a quarter of Sachsen-Anhalt's labor force is employed 
10. Detlev Rohwedder, the first chairman of the Treuhand, initially estimated revenues at DM 
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Chemicals  296  1,419  4.8 
Metals  414  3,209  6.8 
Mechanical  27 1  838  3.9 
engineering 
Table 5.12  Perceived Investment Obstacles: A Survey 
Environmental 
Legal Uncertainty  Administration  Infrastructure  Liabilities 
Light industries  95  671  7.1 
Textiles  169  1,301  7.7 














































Source; Deutscher Industrie und Handelstag, Autumn Member Survey. 
Note: Figures are given in terms of  percentage of respondents answering affirmatively. 
Table 5.13  Workers per Firm 
Industry  FRG  GDR  Ratio  I  Industry  FRG  GDR  Ratio 
Source: Schnabel (1990). 
in the chemical industry (see table 5.13), estimated to have to shrink by two- 
thirds in the medium run (see “Man lasst uns nicht sterben” 1991). Privatiza- 
tion and regional policies should be strictly separated: if  continuing support 
for economically nonviable enterprises is regarded as justified,  the decision 
should reflect the political concern for regional balance and be funded outside 
the privatizing agency. A stronger regional differentiation of investment sub- 
sidies would be a promising start. 
Auctions 
Should the THA sell by auction rather than using customized sales? A criti- 
cism frequently levied at the THA holds that a shift to auctions with a sole 
emphasis on the bidding price would have shifted the valuation exercise to the 
individuals  best  informed  about  the  potential  of  firms, the  bidders,  while 
avoiding excess windfall gains. The criticism fails to bite in several respects. 
First, the Treuhand did not inherit a salable portfolio but had to create privatiza- 
ble units by recombining resources within the existing industrial behemoths. 
Second, social and private valuations of enterprises are likely to differ sub- 
stantially. In particular, East German firms capable of  buying and closing a 
potential Eastern competitor would have valued the Eastern firm in relation to 171  East German Economic Reconstruction 
the market power rent. By insisting on investment and employment guarantees 
and hence on a restructuring strategy of the purchaser, the Treuhand reduced 
the scope for privately optimal but socially damaging asset transfers. 
Restructuring and Liquidation 
Much of the easily privatizable capital stock has by now changed hands. The 
Treuhand portfolio is thus becoming increasingly lemon-heavy: in an extensive 
survey of  1,500 Treuhand enterprises, the DIW concluded that 50-70  percent 
of the remaining enterprises cannot be privatized in their present state (“DIW 
Pladoyer fur degressive Subvention”  199  l),” requiring  either liquidation or 
extensive restructuring. 
The Treuhand’s emphasis on restructuring  has attracted  widespread criti- 
cism. The critics argue that the Treuhand has neither the responsibility nor the 
ability to restructure: if an enterprise is viable after restructuring, then, surely, 
a private investor will be willing to undertake the job. The Treuhand, however, 
enjoys several advantages not available to private investors, in particular, the 
ability to internalize externalities relating to infrastructure, politics, and indus- 
trial structure and the ability to recombine existing assets to create a-roughly 
restructured-salable  enterprise. Restructuring in this broad sense remains de- 
sirable. 
The real danger over the next few years is the continued support of those 
enterprises without realistic hope for survival. By pursuing the policy of post- 
poning the bankruptcy of  a significant fraction of  East Germany’s industrial 
sector, the THA is allocating scarce resources to the stabilization of obsolete 
economic structures in preference to providing assistance to salvageable sec- 
tors. While the cushioning of the adjustment process is desirable, the social 
safety net must be directed toward mitigating the consequences of the neces- 
sary structural adjustment, not toward preventing the adjustment itself. Pro- 
tecting people, not jobs, is the appropriate outlook. Rapid action on the liquida- 
tion front carries an additional political economy advantage: by  imposing a 
front-end liquidation of the nonsalvageable enterprises, the unemployment rate 
jumps initially rather than increasing over an extended period. Front-loading 
of the adjustment cost focuses attention on increasing training and employment 
for displaced workers rather than on halting the rise of unemployment. 
5.4  Migration 
From  the  summer  of  1989 to  unification,  some 540,000 East  Germans 
moved to West Germany, followed by approximately 200,000 movers since. In 
11. Enterprise managers are substantially more optimistic: while only 10 percent see their enter- 
prises as currently competitive, some 30 percent believe that a competitive state will be reached 
within a year and a further 44 percent that snccessful restructuring will be concluded after two 
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addition, approximately 500,000 East German residents commute to work in 
the West, bringing the total labor force shift to more than 1 million. 
The desire to halt migration from East to West Germany provided a major 
impetus to the course of  economic unification.  But is such migration  really 
undesirable on purely economic grounds? Given time constraints in the con- 
struction of new plants, the alternative “employment in the East versus employ- 
ment in the West” has not been relevant in the last two years and will remain 
irrelevant for a large fraction of the East German labor force for years to come. 
In the end, aggregate welfare arguments do not add up to a convincing case 
against migration. The concern with migration derives primarily from the dis- 
tributional implications for wages and a fear that East Germany might be irre- 
versibly hollowed out. Three questions arise. First, were the initial mass migra- 
tion scenarios realistic? Second, has the policy of wage equalization backfired, 
inducing unemployment migration where wage migration might not have been 
a threat? Finally, does commuting obviate the migration threat? 
The initial scenarios of mass migration  lacked plausibility. Extrapolations 
based on the migration flows in the first few months following the collapse of 
the Wall confused stock adjustments with steady-state flows. After the initial 
wave, migration has amounted to barely 1 percent of the population per annum. 
Automatic  stabilizers,  in  particular,  rising  rents  and  falling  employment 
chances, further reduced migration pressures. 
While the initial scenarios exaggerated the migration potential, the possibil- 
ity of continued westward migration  of  the young, restless,  and skilled, and 
thereby the transformation of East Germany into a permanently underindustri- 
alized  northern  mezzogiomo, appeared  real  and  was  used  to justify union 
claims for rapid wage equalization. Rightly so? 
The gain from working in the West cannot be disputed: both the commuter 
and the migration households experienced real income gains far in excess of 
the gains achieved by households remaining in East Germany (see table 5.14). 
In line with initial expectations, the typical commuter/migrant tends to work 
in industry (26.4 percent), trade (15.9 percent), construction (14.6 percent), or 
Table 5.14  Income Effects of Commuting and Migration 
Households  Households 
All Households  with Commuters  Moving West 
Disposable income: 
May 1990 (DM) 
March 1991 (DM) 
Average real increase (%) 
614  636  875 
745  967  1,618 
12.1  41.1  79.5 
Population fraction experiencing 
real increase (%)  60.3  81.7  ... 
Population (thousands)  15,751.9  1,073.9  ... 
Source: Krause, Headey, and Habich (1992). 173  East German Economic Reconstruction 
Table 5.15  Migration Plans (%) 
Short Run  Medium Run 
Total 
Unsatisfied with household income 
Expectation of  own unemployment 




Highly qualified employee 
House owners 



























Source: Based on a socioeconomic survey. Calculations reported in DIW  Wochenbericht, nos. 
5-6  (1992). 
Note: Willingness of employed males aged younger than 49 years to migrate to West Germany. 
services (14.0 percent),  is fairly young  (65 percent  younger  than  thirty-six 
years; average age thirty-one),  has concluded an apprenticeship (69 percent), 
and is presently employed as a skilled worker (43 percent). 
Yet survey evidence on the migration behavior of economically active young 
males-the  dominant migration group-suggests  that the income gap was not 
the only or even the dominant incentive to migrate. As table 5.15, summarizing 
the responses of employed East Germans, suggests, the short-run mobility was 
furthermore quite small. Among the reasons given, unemployment dominates, 
followed by concerns about the environment, with income differentials ranking 
only third. 
The responses also indicate a surprising homogeneity of  answers with re- 
spect to educational background and current employment. In conjunction, mi- 
gration responses may be more highly varied across regions than across quali- 
fications. In particular, the industrial south, suffering from high unemployment 
and some of the worst environmental damage, appears to be headed for the 
largest population loss. In accordance with most empirical findings on migra- 
tion patterns, house ownership significantly lowers willingness to migrate. 
Table 5.16 extends the survey to all males in the age group. Again, unem- 
ployment significantly increases the willingness to migrate. 
Surprisingly, individuals on short time, and hence realistically headed for 
unemployment, are least mobile in the short as well as in the medium run, 
possibly reflecting a perceived inability to find employment in West Germany. 
The survey rejects the hypothesis of  an imminent mass migration in the spring 
of  1990. Job security rather than wage differentials appears to have been the 
main driving force behind migration. Indeed, rapid monetary union-with  the 
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Table 5.16  Willingness to Go West (%) 
Medium 
Short Term  Term 
Total  4.9  50.2 
Short time work  2.2  46.1 
Unemployed  7.4  59.2 
Commuters  9.3  61.9 
Fully employed  4.6  47.9 
Source; See table 5.15. 
Nore; Willingness of  working-age males younger than 49 years. 
increased rather than reduced the mobility of East German workers. The possi- 
bility becomes more plausible if  the skill composition of the labor force is 
taken  into account:  (almost)  wage equalization  across the board  may  have 
driven older and unskilled workers with low probability of finding work in 
the West into long-term unemployment while failing to close the wage gap 
sufficiently for the most mobile highly skilled labor force groups.'* 
Outlook 
The East German capital-to-labor ratio at present lies substantially below 
the West German ratio. With free factor mobility, equalization will occur over 
the medium run. Two possibilities arise: an eastward movement of capital (the 
miracle outcome) or a westward movement of  labor (the rnezzogiorno out- 
come). Some westward labor migration  is unavoidable and even desirable. 
How far the economy shifts toward the mezzogiorno outcome depends on the 
wage and investment policies adopted. Low initial unit labor costs attract in- 
vestment and favor the miracle outcome. The choice for rapid wage equaliza- 
tion contributed to the rapid rise in unemployment and on balance has likely 
increased rather than decreased migration, thus supporting the mezzogiorno so- 
lution. 
In the remainder of this paper, we sketch three questions that no doubt will 
continue to be  debated as developments  in the  East unfold  over the  next 
decade. 
5.5  Unemployment or Status Quo Subsidies? 
Unification has taken place, and it is too late to set the clock back on such 
key decisions as the conversion rate, the integrated labor market, and the open 
internal trade regime. A key question remaining for the coming years concerns 
12. While 78.8 percent of individuals older than fifty-five years categorically ruled out westward 
migration, only 29.6 percent of  the seventeen- to thirty-four-year-olds expressed the same senti- 
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the subsidy strategy. At present, the Treuhand runs an open-ended account for 
most firms in its p~rtfolio,'~  subsidizing substantial losses. With the Treuhand 
holding the bag and unions pushing, there is no effective mechanism of wage 
restraint-parity  in the express lane is virtually inevitable. But, even if parity 
is reached, should the policy be to maintain existing firms and employment, or 
should policy try to achieve a maximum of restructuring? 
To some extent, the privatization process brings with it a restructuring, often 
agreed on in an explicit fashion, although one will have to see how these argu- 
ments fare if firms get into trouble. But the hard part of privatization has as yet 
not taken place-firm  closing has been minimal even though a third of firms 
were thought to be unviable and another third of questionable staying power. 
In the meantime, employment is de facto subsidized and with it the status quo. 
Wage increases have to date not been passed on to producer prices (see table 
5.17), a reflection largely of the slim margin of price competitiveness enjoyed 
by East German products. 
Relative wages in East Germany have increased significantly since unifica- 
tion, approaching 60-70  percent of the West German levels in the spring of 
1992 (see table 5.18).  While relative labor costs reflecting lower nonwage labor 
costs remain  significantly  lower  at around 50 percent  of the West German 
level, the still lower productivity ratio implies that unit labor costs in East Ger- 
many remain above the West German level. In consequence, wage bills for a 
large fraction of the East German enterprises exceed net value added at factor 
costs. The net losses are covered by Treuhand liquidity loans. 
Two  radically  different  policy  options  are open.  One is the proposal  by 
Akerlof et al. (1991) explicitly to subsidize wages so as to enhance profitabil- 
ity, competitiveness, and hence viability of employment in the East. The pro- 
posal has been formulated as well as one could hope to make the case, showing 
that, without a wage  subsidy, East Germany is simply outpriced  and hence 
largely  unemployed.  But there is something deeply unsatisfying  in this ap- 
proach: it basically takes as given that the existing firms and products are sub- 
stantially  viable  and that it is only a question of bringing costs in line with 
prices at which output can be sold. 
The proposal in no way  obstructs the formation of new firms; on the con- 
trary, it subsidizes employment and hence encourages the formation of new 
firms. But the weight of the proposal is to subsidize the currently existing em- 
ployment patterns-simply  to make it possible to keep doing what has been 
done in the past, But there is no reason to believe-and  maybe danger in be- 
lieving-that  most or even half of the remaining firms are viable in anything 
resembling their current structure. A recent survey shows that Treuhand firms 
are systematically more optimistic about their economic prospects than private 
firms even though  the reality, in market terms, is the other way  round. The 
13. Liquidity credits for the lowest two classifications of enterprises have been discontinued- 
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Table 5.17  Prices (1989 = 100) 
Producer Prices  Cost of Living 
Jul. 1990  64.2  98.0 
Sep. 1991  63.2  115.4 
Nov. 1991  63.2  127.6 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report (various 1991 issues). 
Table 5.18  Profitability of East German Firms 
Gross Wages  E. German Wage 
(% of value added)  (% of W.  German wage) 
Textiles  213.7 
Chemicals  2 10.9 
Electrical  120.6 
Machinery  102.4 
Printing  74.5 
Energy  30.0 








Source: DIW Wochenbericht, no. 5 (1992). 
alternative proposal, then, is to emphasize change and to subsidize that change 
aggressively. That means putting a firm end to the financing that will flow to 
all Treuhand firms-say  after eight months-and  forcing them at that point to 
borrow from commercial banks or to face automatic bankruptcy. 
The accelerated termination of  the current open-ended credits should have 
a counterpart in extended unemployment benefits, generous early separation 
payments, and a far better mechanism to finance small- and medium-sized 
firms. In the financing area, commercial banks do not do well in promoting the 
growth of small- and medium-sized businesses because collateral tends to be 
poor. As a result, retained earnings or family assets tend to finance the start- 
up, and these sources will be, of course, lacking in East Germany for years to 
come. Therefore, public participation funds (whether local, state, or federal) 
for any kind of  small- and medium-sized  businesses  should be set up with 
extremely simple methods of securing and monitoring capital participations. 
These funds could play an  initiating role in sponsoring new firms without even 
applying much of a subsidy, if any; their role is to act as intermediary in the 
capital market segment, where business formation is slowest and self-finance 
is the rule. 
Because of  the absence of  self-finance, a strong case can be made for a 
public role. Of course, all this runs counter to the belief that markets do all the 
necessary work. But there cannot be any illusion: at present, East Germany 
is on welfare, and the current course of operations is to write blank checks. 
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fronting workers crassly with the need to put themselves in a new job, and 
facilitating the formation of a service and small enterprise sector promise bet- 
ter results than a massive status quo subsidy. Specifically, if workers were to 
go into training programs rather than continuing on short hours or absentee 
status in firms ultimately bound to go into liquidation, the restructuring of em- 
ployment could be advanced by years. 
5.6  Is East Germany Now Better Off? 
Our next question is an almost surprisingly disingenuous one. Is East Ger- 
many now economically better off? The presumption surely was that the transi- 
tion to a market economy would make the economy much better off-goods 
readily  available,  efficient  production  translating  into low  prices  and  high 
wages,  a maximum  of  opportunity.  If  there  were losers, it would  surely be 
possible to compensate them. But there remains a doubt: mass unemployment 
and relative prices sharply different from what they were two years ago leave 
some room for a question mark. Is it possible, to stretch the point, that Czecho- 
slovakia might be doing better even without a rich brother? 
At first sight, East Germany is in fact better off. Real disposable income is 
up, and consumption has increased 17 percent, not even counting the welfare 
improvements that stem from increased variety  and the far more convenient 
availability of goods. 
But is that gain widely  distributed, or does it fall mostly  on those groups 
that directly participate in the West German economy or hold high-wage jobs? 
Do old people, for example, share in the benefits of transition? The question 
is appropriate because of the massive changes in relative Prices. The abolition 
of consumer price subsidies resulted in significant increases in the consumer 
price index, concentrated in rent and transportation price hikes (see table 5.19). 
A report of the DIW shows that 60 percent of households surveyed showed 
a gain in real disposable income, leaving 40 percent without such a gain and 
possibly  with losses. No doubt, the losses would be even larger without the 
substantial leveling effects of taxes and transfers. In fact, so far taxes and trans- 
fers have kept the distribution substantially unchanged (see table 5.20). 
Greater wage differentiation and a less complete  system of  transfers will 
likely worsen income distribution in the future. The question then is whether 
growth and migration are sufficient to enable everybody to get ahead. That is 
questionable; less questionable is where the East German economy would have 
Table 5.19  Prices in November 1991 (1989 = 100) 
Total  127.6  Food  126.4 
Clothing  72.4  I  Rents, energy  375.8 
Household items  85.0 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report (various 1991 issues). 178  Rudiger Dornbusch and Holger C. Wolf 
Table 5.20  Household Income Distribution by Quintile (% of income) 
1990  1991 
Bottom  Top  Bottom  Top 
~~ 
Gross income  6.7  35.8  3.9  39.8 
Disposable income  14.1  29.9  14.7  31.2 
Source; Krause, Headey, and Habich (1992). 
headed with another ten years of mismanagement. Against that counterfactual 
there is bound to be an improvement. 
But how about the comparison with Czechoslovakia? Clearly, the massive 
transfer payments and the large investment flows are rapidly transforming East 
Germany into an economy where the average standard of living will be 40 or 
50 percent above that in Czechoslovakia. The current high unemployment is 
inevitable as an adjustment  phenomenon  and because  of  transfer payments 
does not fairly represent the level of consumption or welfare in East Germany. 
5.7  Wirtschaftswunder or Welfare Albatross? 
Our final question is what East Germany will look like in a decade. The 
answer is likely this: some regions will have a dramatic improvement in pros- 
perity-border  regions that are not environmentally damaged-and  other re- 
gions, notably along the Polish border, will fall sharply behind. Regions that 
are environmentally hazardous will become deindustrialized and depopulated. 
In West Germany, there are today substantial regional variations in per capita 
income, and the same will be true in the East, with the high-income region of 
the East toward the bottom of the West German distribution. Migration will do 
a large part of the work, and massive investment, private and public, will have 
to do the rest. 
After a lull in 1990, investment has increased substantially to a third of GNP 
and is expected to increase further in coming years (see table 5.21). Investment 
is further boosted by ambitious plans to modernize East Germany’s telecom- 
munications system, with a total price tag of DM 60 billion until 1997, as well 
as an overhaul of the transportation system, estimated at DM 700 billion over 
the next two decades. 
Parallel to the high rate of investment, there is clear evidence of major re- 
vamping inside the firms. Table 5.22 shows the range of activities with which 
Treuhand firms try to make themselves attractive and profitable. 
The relatively  small size of  East Germany has made it possible to move 
managers and administrators over on a scale that actually can create the re- 
quired market culture in the East. The very short distances make commuting a 
real possibility-less  than an hour for many, less than two in extreme cases. 
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Table 5.21  Investment in East Germany (billion DM) 
Equipment  Buildings 
Private  Public  Private  Public  Residential Housing  Total 
1989  17.0  2.7  14.4  5.5  10.5  50.1 
1990  17.4  2.6  14.6  6.6  7.1  48.3 
1991  33.4  3.5  14.9  9.4  6.8  68.0 
1992  44.1  4.0  19.5  13.6  7.1  88.3 
Source: DIW  Wochenbericht, no. 41  (1991). 
Table 5.22  Reform Measures of lkeuhand Enterprises 
Firm Size: Employees 
<  200  201-999  >  999 
Outsourcing 
Improvement of distribution: 
In the East 

































Source: DIW and IfW (1991a, 1991b). 
Note; Figures are given in terms of  percentage of  respondents having taken the action. 
capital over the next decade can move the region substantially in the direction 
of West Germany. 
What will East Germany do? It is unlikely that it will do exactly what the 
West is doing. More likely, activities will be somewhat less green, somewhat 
less customized, and substantially more focused on emerging markets in the 
East. But, of course, in manufacturing there will be competition with the low- 
wage transition economies. Just as the United States competes with Mexico 
in the production of  entry-level cars, East Germany must now compete with 
Czechoslovakia. The sooner the new production structure is put in place, the 
better the chances to start competing. 
There is no presumption whatsoever that income equalization will take place 
on a regional basis in a decade-that  does not exist even in countries with 
many decades of regional p01icies.l~  In fact, within West Germany’s states (ex- 
cepting the city-lander), the spread top to bottom of per capita income is 28 
14. Near 80 percent equalization will put East Germany ahead of the United States in terms of 
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percent. Once we look at partial equalization-say,  75 percent-and  recognize 
the great scope for commuting, productivity improvements, and the externali- 
ties deriving from public capital, the investment effort may be radically smaller 
than the DM  1,000-DM  2,000 billion  that have been  produced  by  various 
models. 
Barro (199 1) has argued that East Germany will take generations-specifi- 
cally, seventy years-not  a decade to fifteen years as we argue, to move close 
to West German standard~.’~  His view is based on research about catch-up and 
convergence among regions and countries over long periods of time. In these 
cross-sectional studies, catch-up is found to be slow and equal to only 2 per- 
cent of the gap each year. 
What is different in the case of East Germany?I6 First, a set of  essential 
prerequisites  in the form of  legal, economic,  and administrative  institutions 
were imported outright. It may take a moment for these to take hold and be- 
come second nature, but they are basically in place. Second, knowledge about 
markets, technology, and business is being imported on a massive scale far in 
excess of the rate that a peripheral country could handle under its own steam. 
Third, commuting and more generally minimal distances generate the maxi- 
mum benefit in terms of exposure and interaction. Fourth, the supply of capital 
is ample and strictly without a regional risk premium. On the contrary, public 
finance strongly supports regional development. The wage strategy, whether 
the government intended this result or not, forces East Germany into the direc- 
tion of a high capital-labor ratio. Politics support that move, and a safety net 
makes sure that it all adds up. 
East Germany will not seem like a miracle.  For that too much money  is 
being spent. However, the turnaround in output and employment is now start- 
ing, and growth will pick up. But, for years to come, just as in the early 1950s, 
high unemployment rates will draw more attention than business formation or 
employment growth. A decade from now, it will suddenly be clear that differ- 
ences have shrunk except in those places where extreme environmental damage 
makes  it  impossible to  work  and  impossible  to  live.  There may  not  be a 
Wirtschuftswunder because transfers and investment will be responsible for the 
rehabilitation. If there were to be a Wunder at all, it would most likely take the 
form of a dramatic increase in East German total factor productivity, which 
offers a powerful alternative to aid and capital investment. 
15. The German government appears much more optimistic, arguing for a five-year convergence 
16. For a further discussion of  this point, see Dornbusch and Wolf (1992). 
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Comment  Janet L. Yellen 
The authors are to be commended for their excellent survey of the progress of 
East German economic reconstruction  since currency union  in July  1990. I 
fully agree with their analysis of the relevant economic history and with their 
diagnosis of  the current economic  situation. In commenting on their paper, 
therefore,  I will  offer  some additional  reflections  on two important  issues 
raised in the paper: the likely length of the transition to Western productivity 
and employment levels and the Treuhand’s privatization strategy. 
The Length of the Transition 
The authors ask of the East German economy the same question that the 
erstwhile mayor of  New York, Ed Koch, continually asked of himself: “How 
am I doing?’  Should the answer be accompanied by Koch’s indomitable grin? 
The authors fail to answer this question, instead leaving the reader with two 
polar possibilities: East Germany may be another German Wirtschufswundel; 
or it may be another Italian mezzugiornu. 
Data in the paper allow calculation of how well East Germany is doing. The 
necessity  in East Germany is to create a stock of new jobs, primarily  in the 
tradable goods sector. At the current time, roughly 50 percent  of  the  labor 
force is in underemployment, disguised unemployment, or full unemployment. 
These include the unemployed,  those on short time, workers in ABMs (East 
Germany’s public works program), workers in retraining programs, and many 
of the remaining workers in Treuhandanstalt firms, whose jobs will need to be 
phased out. The rest of the nonagricultural work force, which is in state and 
municipal  governments,  trade and transport, construction,  self-employment, 
and a small nucleus in new private enterprises, are in jobs that are, in a long- 
run sense, viable. Thus, I will assume that new jobs are needed for roughly 50 
percent of the work force. 
New jobs require new capital stock. How long will it take to create enough 
capital to provide new jobs for 50 percent of the work force? One key number 
in this calculation is the rate at which new investment  is occurring in East 
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Germany. According to Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) es- 
timates presented in the authors’ table 5.21, gross private nonresidential invest- 
ment in 1992 will total DM 63.6 billion. Assuming a civilian labor force of 7.7 
million, this amounts to DM 8,260 per worker.’ In West Germany, capital per 
worker, excluding residential housing, at the start of 1991 was DM 131,943.* 
Does the East German rate of capital formation entail a long or a short tran- 
sition? 
A variety of assumptions are necessary to see how long it will take before 
unemployment and disguised unemployment in the East German economy will 
disappear. The first assumption concerns the average capital-labor ratio of East 
German jobs. Since wages in  East  and West  Germany  are rapidly  headed 
toward equality, it makes sense to assume, as a first approximation, that the 
average capital intensity of jobs in the East will be similar to that of those in 
the West. Three other assumptions are necessary in order to project the path of 
East German employment over time: (1) the relative capital intensities of the 
“old” sector (the sector of the economy now providing viable jobs) and the 
“new” sector; (2) the rates of depreciation of capital in the old and new sectors; 
and (3) the rate of migration. 
Under the most optimistic assumptions, East Germany could experience a 
Wirtschaftswunder-a  6.9 year transition to full employment (defined as a 6 
percent natural rate of unemployment)-if  current gross investment levels are 
maintained. The optimistic assumptions are that the capital intensities of the 
old and new sectors are identical, that there is no depreciation of  capital in 
either the old or the new sectors or the economy so that all investment is allo- 
cated to capital formation in the new sector, and that migration begins at 2.5 
percent per year and falls linearly to zero as the economy reaches full em- 
ployment. 
But the transition could take much longer. The optimistic scenario ignores 
depreciation. With more realistic assumptions concerning depreciation of capi- 
tal, the transition lengthens substantially. For example, with a 10 percent depre- 
ciation rate in the “old” sector and depreciation in the new sector of the one- 
horse shay type with a long lifetime so that replacement is not necessary in the 
period of calculation, the transition lengthens to twenty-five years. 
The “optimistic” scenario further assumes that jobs in the old and new sec- 
tors of  the East German economy are equally capital intensive. But, realisti- 
cally, the “old” sector of the East German economy, now providing viable jobs, 
is heavily weighted with self-employment, state and local government, trade, 
1. In contrast, estimated gross and net investment per worker in 1992 are DM  13,969 and DM 
4,749, respectively, in West Germany. 
2. This estimate is consistent with the predictions of  the Solow model under the assumption 
that West Germany is in steady-state growth. Along a steady-state growth path, k* =  i/(n + A). 
Assuming population growth (n) of  1 percent and technological change (A) of  2.5 percent, the 
implied steady-state capital intensity, k*, corresponding to the 1992 estimated net investment per 
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and services, all of which are relatively labor-intensive activities. We therefore 
ran an alternative  simulation, otherwise identical to our “optimistic” case, in 
which the existing jobs in East Germany are assumed to be in relatively labor- 
intensive sectors while new jobs must be created in sectors that are relatively 
capital intensive. Specifically, we assumed that jobs in the old sector require 
(and currently possess) capital per worker that is 50 percent below the West 
German economy-wide  average while jobs in the new sector require capital 
per worker that is 50 percent above the West German economy-wide average. 
With  half  the Eastern  labor  force  in  the  old  and  new  sectors, the  average 
capital-labor ratios for the East and West German economies are identical. In 
this case, the transition lengthens from 6.9 to 10 years. For a reasonable range 
of parameter values concerning depreciation and relative capital intensities in 
the old and new  sectors, the  length  of the transition is between  seven and 
twenty-five years. 
A final assumption underlying these computations is that the East German 
and West German capital-labor ratios are, on average, similar. If the average 
capital intensity of East German jobs turns out to be higher than that of those 
in the West, the transition  may  take substantially longer. This could occur if 
newly created jobs turn out to be highly capital intensive. For example, if the 
capital required to create a new job in East Germany is 50 percent higher than 
that assumed in the simulations described above, analogous computations yield 
full employment only after ten to thirty-three years of per capita capital accu- 
mulation of DM 8,260 instead of  seven to twenty-five years. Unfortunately, 
there are two reasons to suspect that Eastern investment may be highly capi- 
tal intensive. 
First, the nature of German subsidies encourages capital intensive invest- 
ments in the East. In order to stimulate investment, the federal government has 
set up a number of  capital subsidy programs, which together cover about 50 
percent of a firm’s investment cost. In West Germany, the capital-labor ratio in 
industry is roughly DM 100,000  per worker. In contrast, the recent investments 
of Volkswagen and Ope1 involve capital-labor ratios of roughly DM 120,000- 
DM 135,000. And Siemens is reportedly building a plant in Brandenburg with 
50 percent government subsidies and capital of DM 500,000 per employee- 
five times the industrial average in West Germany. We  are not aware of  any 
statistics that accurately portray the capital intensity of new investment in the 
East, but, since the length of time to full employment is roughly inversely pro- 
portional to the capital-labor ratio, it is important to discover whether the in- 
centives for high capital intensity have resulted in significant bias. If  there is 
such a bias,  there  is less room  for optimism,  and the  German  government 
should reevaluate its policies for investment subsidies. 
A second reason for concern about the capital intensity of  Eastern invest- 
ment is that roughly half the DM 63.6 billion of “private” investment in East 
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telecommunications, transportation, and energy.3  (Investment by West German 
firms in East Germany is expected to amount to about DM 35 billion according 
to an If0 poll.) These sectors are enormously capital intensive: in West Ger- 
many, capital per worker in transport and telecommunications and in utilities 
is, respectively, twice and eight times the West German economy-wide aver- 
age. Thus, our baseline calculations tend to overstate the amount of job cre- 
ation associated with current investment levels. 
The optimistic scenario described above also assumes that the rate of gross 
investment per worker will remain constant over time. Arguably, this is too 
pessimistic an assumption: perhaps, once more infrastructure investment has 
been completed, the pace of private investment may increase. However, invest- 
ment could also decline if there is a recession in West Germany, as now seems 
likely. One of the motives for West German firms to invest in the East is that, 
following unification, they found themselves with extra demand and little spare 
capacity. A recession in the West would obviate the need for Western firms to 
expand capacity. In addition, higher interest rates due to tight Bundesbank pol- 
icy would likewise discourage investment. 
Finally, the optimistic scenario that I have described also assumes that public 
investment  will continue  and even expand. There  is also the risk that  such 
spending will need to be curtailed. This could occur for a number of reasons. 
First, a recession in the West will depress tax revenues and swell an already 
large budget deficit, reducing the ability of the German government to finance 
an ambitious infrastructure plan for the East. Second, the costs of unity to the 
German government will inexorably  mount as the wage increases that have 
already been negotiated take effect over the next several years. If we assume 
that the German government  will be unwilling to expand its budget  deficit 
further, then  the extra government  spending necessitated by wage increases 
will translate dollar for dollar into reduced spending on public capital forma- 
tion in the East and other government-supported activities. Consider the arith- 
metic. Of the roughly 7.7 million workers in the Eastern labor force, a large 
majority  (perhaps as much as two-thirds) are directly or indirectly paid  by 
the government. This includes state and local government workers, workers in 
transport, post, and telecommunications, workers in Treuhand firms, and work- 
ers on public construction projects. Any wage increases for these workers will 
be  financed  with government  funds. In  addition, the payments received  by 
those who are unemployed,  on short time, and in public works or retraining 
programs are indexed to the wages received by the Eastern work force. Retire- 
ment benefits also tend to rise with wage levels. Higher wages in the East will 
thus raise the expense of  supporting the unemployed  and underemployed  as 
well. High wage settlements in the East are detrimental to Eastern recovery 
3. “Private investment” includes the investment of government enterprises, which importantly 
include post and telecommunications, railways, and government-owned utilities. 186  Rudiger Dornbusch and  Holger C. Wolf 
through this spending channel as well as via their direct negative effects on the 
viability of existing jobs and the profitability of new investment. 
Treuhand Policy 
The authors have provided a very good overview of the policies being pur- 
sued by the Treuhandanstalt, the agency responsible for privatizing East Ger- 
man industry. The key questions are, Has the Treuhand pursued a wise pnva- 
tization strategy? and, How should it deal with the money-losing firms that 
remain in its portfolio? 
The authors outline two extreme options: unemployment or status quo sub- 
sidies. The Treuhand could liquidate any money-losing firms that it cannot 
quickly sell, throwing workers into the job market, an option that is not un- 
thinkable given the generous level of  unemployment compensation and the 
wide range of  “public works” programs that are available. Or the Treuhand 
could continue subsidizing its money-losing properties to preserve jobs. 
There is also a middle course. The middle course is what I perceive the 
Treuhand to be pursuing, and it is the course that I personally favor. The middle 
course is to agree to invest money-within  limits-to  save or preserve jobs in 
the course of privatizing firms and to close firms that cannot be privatized with 
a reasonable injection of  government funds. If the Treuhand is permitted to 
pursue this strategy, most of the privatization work will be completed over the 
next several years, and the privatized firms that remain will be operating under 
hard budget constraints. 
Why should the Treuhand spend money to save jobs? The logic is simple: it 
is both in the overall social interest and in the financial interest of the govern- 
ment. There is a major distortion in the East German economy: the current 
wage is far in excess of the market clearing level. With about one-third of the 
labor force unemployed or underemployed, the social cost of labor is low-far 
below the wage. As a result, there is too little employment. Arguably, high 
levels of unemployment speed economic restructuring by creating high moti- 
vation for workers to retrain and a pool of  labor for new firms to hire. But 
unemployment is already above any level that could be deemed optimal for 
this purpose. The social gain from job creation exceeds the gain to potential 
employers. This justifies the Treuhand’s policy from a social welfare stand- 
point. From a budgetary standpoint, the logic is equally simple: the budgetary 
gain from job creation is large and positive. A typical individual who leaves 
the unemployment rolls and finds work saves the German government 79.1 
percent of his previous total compensation through lower unemployment bene- 
fits and higher income tax and social insurance receipts. This means that the 
German government saves money if it can create a job by spending less than 
79 percent of worker compensation to do so. This provides a strong budgetary 
rationale for spending a significant amount of money to create new jobs or to 
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And this is precisely what the Treuhand has done, albeit haphazardly and 
without the transparency that the process should ideally have in the absence of 
political considerations. In selling the firms in its portfolio, the Treuhand has 
strongly favored investors who guarantee higher employment and future invest- 
ment  levels, not  those  offering  the  largest  up-front  bids.  It has  frequently 
“sold’ firms for a token DM 1.00. The Treuhand has also accepted negative 
sales prices: this occurs when the Treuhand invests to “restructure” a firm prior 
to sale or when, as in the Zeiss Jena case described by the authors, the Treuhand 
provides “start-up funds” or “loss compensation.” In other words, it is spending 
money to create jobs. 
The economic logic that  I have just outlined  suggests that the Treuhand 
should establish an appropriate “shadow price” of  employment to use in its 
evaluations of outside bids. Investors would receive a job creation  “credit” 
based on the number of jobs saved and the number of future jobs guaranteed 
through promised  investment. This credit would be  added to the  investor’s 
(possibly negative) monetary bid in scoring proposals. In actuality, the Treu- 
hand is pursuing a policy that may approximate the rule that I have outlined. 
Because the methodology employed is ad hoc, however, the Treuhand is proba- 
bly spending too much money to save jobs in some instances and too little in 
others. In the case of  Zeiss Jena, for example, the $212,500 per job that the 
Treuhand paid seems excessive since this amount probably exceeds the present 
discounted value of the budgetary savings even under the assumption that the 
workers would otherwise remain permanently unemployed. The second prob- 
lem with the Treuhand’s approach is that it is not transparent: potential invest- 
ors are aware that the Treuhand cares about jobs but have no way of computing 
“how much” the Treuhand cares in preparing their bids. 
Even with its heavy emphasis on employment, and even given its willingness 
to sell firms for a negative price, the Treuhand is appropriately  following a 
middle course, malung tough decisions to cut employment as privatization oc- 
curs. Consider the evidence. There were initially 3 million industrial jobs in 
Treuhand firms. Thus far, roughly 1 million jobs have been saved by the Treu- 
hand, but about half are in service-sector establishments. A rough estimate is 
that a maximum of 500,000 jobs in industry have thus far been saved. Since, 
at present, there are about 1.9 million industrial jobs in Treuhand firms, at least 
600,000 industrial jobs have been eliminated by the Treuhand in the course of 
privatization. A typical privatization involves employment reductions ranging 
up to 80 percent. Since many of  the remaining Treuhand properties  will be 
difficult to privatize and are likely to involve even smaller job savings, a rea- 
sonable forecast is that only 20-30  percent of the original industrial jobs will 
remain  when  privatization  is  complete. The  German  government has  also 
shown backbone by  ending special East German short-time arrangements on 
1 January of this year, forcing many of the workers on these schemes into open 
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status quo. The Treuhand is appropriately spending money to save jobs, and, 
arguably, it is spending too little rather than too much. All in all, the Treuhand’s 
policies seem reasonable. 
There is further reason why  the German  government should be  willing 
to  pay  limited  amounts to  subsidize privatization  of  Treuhand firms.  The 
Treuhand’s privatization strategy has succeeded in  saving a large number of 
activities that may serve as the nuclei for successful further growth of jobs. In 
particular, the Treuhand has saved many of the core businesses of the former 
state-owned enterprises. The value of preserving an activity may be dispropor- 
tionate to the number of jobs that are saved if the activity has the potential for 
future growth or if its survival makes other investments viable. As the authors 
note, investment decisions are highly interdependent, and multiplier effects are 
at work in East Germany. 
Let me offer an example. In Eisenhuttenstadt, near the Polish border, there is 
a large steel factory-Eko  Stahl-whose  survival was problematic. In January 
1992, the Treuhand finally announced that it would sell this company to the 
West German steelmaker Krupp. The sale involves substantial Treuhand sub- 
sidies. Had the plant been closed, Eisenhuttenstadt would have become a ghost 
town. Even under the privatization plan, employment at the firm will fall dra- 
matically, from 11,300 prior to unification to about 2,800. However, since the 
plant will survive, so will numerous local independent metal-working enter- 
prises and privatized firms that provide repair services to the steel plant. Major 
investments currently planned for the revived town include two shopping cen- 
ters and a plant manufacturing advanced hydrofoils located next to the steel 
mill. 
The authors argue that Treuhand firms should face hard budget constraints 
soon-within  eight months’ time-either  by being forced to use commercial 
borrowing or, if unsuccessful, to face bankruptcy. I agree that hard budget con- 
straints must be imposed. In fact, many people in Germany believe that a hard 
budget constraint has been imposed because Treuhandanstalt liquidity loans 
have been capped this year at a total of  DM 30 billion. This constraint, how- 
ever, has been quietly subverted by allowing Treuhand firms to engage in asset 
stripping by  selling or mortgaging their considerable land holdings. As the 
authors’ table 5.18 shows, in many sectors wage payments exceed value added. 
With a cap on its liquidity credits, the Treuhand is underwriting these losses 
by,  in effect, selling off its remaining valuable assets. The Treuhand told us 
that firms were permitted to do this only if they were expected ultimately to 
survive. 
Morals 
Let me conclude by pointing to just one of  the morals of the East German 
story for other times and other places. This concerns the importance of wages. 
The East German depression is so deep, indeed much deeper than that of its 
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The warning to Eastern countries concerns the importance of keeping wages 
in line. Excess wages will make employment and investment unprofitable. In 
addition,  they  will  throw  government  budgets  out of  balance.  The conse- 
quences of high wages for East German recovery have been largely offset by 
massive  transfers.  But  the  German  government  has yet  to face the  conse- 
quences of future rises in East German wages, which, at a minimum, will affect 
the costs of state and local government, the cost of infrastructural investment, 
government make-work programs, unemployment insurance, and short time. 
The rising interest costs of the German debt may threaten the government with 
a loss of flexibility in expenditure, creating a dilemma similar to that now fac- 
ing President Bush. I started by remembering Mayor Koch. In the end, it is 
appropriate to remember another New York mayor, John Lindsay, who granted 
large wage increases to city unions, subsequently leading to the bankruptcy of 
New York. The East German case yet again underscores the dangers of exces- 
sive wage increases in the  absence of  vigilant public watchfulness over the 
public purse. 
Discussion Summary 
Kalman Mizsei asked the authors how well the Treuhand was functioning from 
a bureaucratic perspective. He wondered whether corruption and inefficiency 
were problems. All of the other East European countries have chosen to create 
privatization institutions that are much smaller and less autonomous than the 
Treuhand. In response, Rudiger Dombusch said that the institutional environ- 
ment at the Treuhand “is a dream,” with no reported scandals. He ascribed this 
success to the fact that the Treuhand is highly visible and is constantly under 
intense political scrutiny. 
Larry Summers criticized the ad hoc  industrial policy  that he believes is 
being implemented by the Treuhand. He suggested that the Yellen plan (i.e., 
an  explicit  wage  subsidy  coupled  with  clean  market-based  privatization) 
looked much better than the current Treuhand policy. Janet Yellen appreciated 
Summers’s support, but she noted that the Yellen plan had little chance of being 
implemented since it has previously been rejected by German policymakers. 
Dani Rodrik noted that it is important to analyze the strategic behavior of 
unions when considering the effect of a wage subsidy. For example, if a gov- 
ernment commits to full employment and uses a wage subsidy as its only in- 
strument, then the unions can extract infinite rents. He believes that wage/em- 
ployment subsidies will be successful only if the government gets trade unions 
“in on the process.” 
Barry Bosworth questioned  Yellen’s  claim that  “a typical  individual who 
leaves the unemployment rolls and finds work saves the German government 
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number assumes that demand for the produced good is perfectly elastic. Bos- 
worth believes  that it is more reasonable to assume that  some jobs that are 
created by the government crowd out private employment. Yellen responded 
by emphasizing that most of the Treuhand firms that produce industrial output 
are in the tradables sector, where demand is highly elastic. 
Dornbusch said that the Treuhand has been too cautious, and he felt that 
some participants were making the same mistake. Initially, the Treuhand had 
predicted that it would sell one-third of its firms, restructure another third, and 
close the remaining third. The Treuhand has done a good job in selling the 
viable firms, but it has not successfully dealt with the remaining two-thirds of 
firms that must be closed or restructured. He argued that Germany should not 
subsidize the status quo since this prevents the necessary  structural changes 
from taking place. 
Dombusch concluded by  emphasizing the important role that commuting 
will play for the economic prospects of East Germany. For example, mass com- 
muting will drastically reduce the capital needs of East Germany. He said that 
all the capital requirement calculations have to be radically scaled down. 
Holger Wolfemphasized that it is inappropriate to assume, as some of  the 
participants had done, that East German and West German wages will quickly 
equilibrate. It may take as long as fifteen years for this convergence to occur. 
Wolf also noted that there are advantages to the fact that the Treuhand does not 
operate with an explicit shadow price for job creation. Having  flexibility is 
helpful in designing idiosyncratic sales packages. Moreover, estimates of these 
prices can be imputed by looking at past deals. 